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Beyond NA- a S enA ei
L Trade Agreements in the Americas
The Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) proposed at the Miami Summit
last December promises to be a historic step that will create the world's largest market. 1
Supported by thirty-four of the western hemisphere's thirty-five countries, such a trade
block will comprise almost a third of the world's wealth.2
Given that more than twenty trade liberalization agreements already exist in this
hemisphere, one of FTAA's primary goals will be to "facilitate the convergence of all [those]
markets" and ultimately "achieve hemispheric free trade by the end of the decade " 3 In the
meantime, prospective FTAA nation members must gain an understanding of current
developments within each of the main trade pacts to ensure a successful transition towards
a unified trade bloc. Among the existing trade agreements in the Americas, the most
prominent ones have experienced several developments worth noting.
A. NAFEA
1. NAFTA and the FTAA
Given that the NAFTA is "the first trade agreement to treat countries from the devel-
oped North and the developing South as equal - a sharp contrast to other arrangements
where rich northern countries confine countries of the South to a lower tier of trading
status," this trade agreement "remains the club which Latin American nations most want
to join." 4 However, while promoting equal trading treatment, the NAFTA "subjects its
parties to very high standards on a comprehensive range of subjects:' from trade in goods
and services to investment, environmental protection, social equity as well as other areas. 5
Since a vast majority of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements "are being con-
cluded with few of the economic, ecological, or social protections that accompany
NAFTA" it seems plausible to assume that the process of forming the FTAA will "create
pressure to erode these provisions ... leading to a patchwork of rules governing trade in
the hemisphere "' 6 At the Miami Summit, for instance, the Latin American countries suc-
ceeded in "watering down the Clinton Administration's policy of requiring them to
achieve certain environmental and [labor] standards before being allowed to enter into
1. Guardian (G), USA: Americas to Establish Largest Free Trade Bloc, (Dec. 12, 1994).
2. Sydney Morning Herald (SMHLD), USA: US Embraces Latin America to Create Huge New Trade
Bloc, (Dec. 2, 1994). Financial Post (FINPO), USA: Existing Agreements Complicate FTAA Deal
(Dec. 17, 1994).
3. Financial Post (FINPO), USA: Build Free Trade in the Americas on NAFTA (December 10, 1994).
4. Financial Post (FINPO), supra note 3. Reuter Newswire, Colombia: Latin Leaders to Proclaim
Faith in Free Markets, (Jun. 13, 1994).
5. Financial Post (FINPO), supra note 3.
6. Id.
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free trade arrangements.' 7 The erosion of such standards has become a source of contro-
versy in the United States. 8
Several U.S. officials, including Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, have admitted
that it is difficult to explain exactly how the formation of the FTAA would affect NAFTA. 9
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the FTAA and the apparent disregard for certain
standards, it is clear that the leaders at the Miami Summit intend for the FTAA to follow
in the footsteps of NAFTA so far as the "process unfolds according to the innovative, for-
ward-looking provisions of NAFTA."0
B. MERCOSUR
1. Trade and Legal Developments
At present, MERCOSUR's members include Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and
Paraguay; Bolivia and Chile will soon follow.'1 This trade agreement, meaning Southern
Cone Common Market, links 211 million people and is the biggest sub-regional trade
pact in South America. 12 Trade has literally tripled since the member nations first signed
the Asunci6n Treaty of 1991. 13 In fact, MERCOSUR "already accounts for half of Latin
America's economic output." '14
While Brazil and Argentina are the two largest partners in the plan, representing 95%
of MERCOSUR's GNP, certain characteristics unique to small countries like Paraguay
promise to encourage the continuing success of MERCOSUR. 15 For instance, financial
companies throughout MERCOSUR are attracted to Paraguay because it "has the advan-
tages of an open financial system, a favorable tax regime and low inflation' ' 16 Indeed,
Paraguay boasts that its privatization is getting under way and that there are "plenty" of
investment opportunities, accompanied by reduced income taxes for five years as well as
the lack of barriers to importing or exporting capital.17
7. Australian Financial Review (AFR), USA: Americas Set Goal at Year 2005 - Western Hemisphere,
(Dec. 12, 1994).
8. Id.
9. Sydney Morning Herald (SMHLD), USA: 'APEC Envy' Proved Driving Force, (Dec. 12, 1994).
10. Financial Post (FINPO), supra note 3.
11. Spicers Centre for Europe (SPICEU), EU: Background - Report on a Policy for Relations Between
the EC and MERCOSUR, (December 9, 1994). BBC Monitoring Service, Brazil: Ouro Preto
Protocol Makes MERCOSUR into an "International Legal Entity", (Dec. 19, 1994).
12. Financial Post (FINPO), USA: Existing Agreements Complicate FTAA Deal (Dec. 17, 1994).
Sunday Age (Melbourne) (SMAGE), USA: Summit Push for a Free-Trade Hemisphere, (Dec. 11,
1994). Australian Financial Review (AFR), Australia: Australia Can be a NAFTA Mini-Amigo -
Chile, (Dec. 13, 1994).
13. Sydney Morning Herald (SMHLD), supra note 2. BBC Monitoring Service, supra note 11.
14. Australian Financial Review (AFR), supra note 7.
15. BBC Monitoring Service, supra note 11.




2. MERCOSUR's Recent Expansion: Implications for the FTAA
MERCOSUR has, since its inception, been a controversial trade pact because it
"specifically prevent[s] members from joining other trade arrangements."18 Brazilian
trade officials, wishing to consolidate their leadership role in South America, maintain
that MERCOSUR "does not plan to join NAFTA."u 9 Instead, they assert that MERCOSUR
wants to sign a bilateral agreement with NAFTA. 20 As one official stated, "It is not one
joining another, but a joint deal."' 21
Despite MERCOSUR's apparent exclusionary stance, the four member nations
recently agreed to expand the scope of their trading agreement. On December 17, 1994,
MERCOSUR was declared to constitute an "international legal entity" when it signed the
Ouro Preto Protocol, an annex to their original Asunci6n Treaty.22 Accordingly, on
January 1, 1995, the institutional structure of this entity will become empowered to nego-
tiate on behalf of MERCOSUR's four countries with other nations and blocs of nations,
such as the NAFTA.23
In addition to the Ouro Preto Protocol, the four countries agreed to implement a
customs agreement among themselves and to freely circulate 90 per cent of the products
exchanged among them by January of this year.24 The remaining 10 per cent of trade,
covering products such as paper from Argentina and peaches from Brazil, will continue to
fall until reaching zero by the year 2000.25 There are plans to appoint special committees,
if necessary, to harmonize the elimination of government policies that hinder free com-
petition.2 6
Perhaps more significantly, MERCOSUR's members "will also adopt common exter-
nal tariffs for most products from countries outside their pact."2 7 The common external
tariff (CET), which averages at 14 percent, is levied on all imports to MERCOSUR from
non-MERCOSUR countries. 28 Approximately 80 percent of products are already covered
by the CET while most of the remainder products will keep their domestic tariffs in place
to target foreign competition.29 MERCOSUR's CET arrangement makes it the only major
"customs union" outside the European Union. 30
18. Sydney Morning Herald (SMHLD), supra note 9.
19. Financial Post (FINPO), supra note 12.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. BBC Monitoring Service, supra note 11.
23. Id. BBC Monitoring Service, Argentina: Menem Says USA Reconsidering Buying Pampa Aircraft;
Comments on US Falklands Role, (Dec.r 14, 1994). Reuter Newswire, USA: Brazilian Sees Panam
Free Trade Zone in Eight Years, (Dec. 14, 1994).
24. BBC Monitoring Service, supra note 11.
25. Financial Times, Survey of MERCOSUR, (Jan. 25, 1995).
26. BBC Monitoring Service, supra note 11.
27. Reuter Newswire, supra note 23.
28. Financial Times, supra note 25.
29.Id.
30. Los Angeles Times, Regional Outlook; Look Out, NAFTA! Latin Trade Bloc Is Growing; The Four-
Nation MERCOSUR is Larger than Europe and Boasts Two Economic Powerhouses: Brazil and
Argentina, (Jan. 24, 1995).
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Joining the ranks of neighboring countries, such as Chile and Bolivia, Colombia and
the Andean Pact also hope to start negotiations on joining the MERCOSUR. 31 On
January 23, 1995, talks between the Andean Pact and MERCOSUR began addressing the
substitution of negotiations between blocs, with no more bilateral agreements. 32 One
source predicted that MERCOSUR's willingness to include new members will eventually
result in MERCOSUR becoming the "main negotiating partner with NAFTA" to create a
successful FTAA. 33
C. CARICOM
1. Trade and Legal Developments
The Caribbean community, which includes thirteen island nations, has a combined
population of six million.34 Like MERCOSUR, CARICOM trade leaders also have an eye
towards expansion of their free trade zone by encouraging closer relations between the
Caribbean and Latin America.35 On January 28, 1995, Chile's President Eduardo Frei and
CARICOM's foreign ministers agreed to preliminary studies for an eventual trade agree-
ment. 36 CARICOM also reached a free trade agreement with Colombia in June of 1994
that came into effect on January 1, 1995.37 Under the accord, Colombia agrees to reduce
tariffs applied to the CARICOM's products over three years, while the member nations
will do the same over a five-year period. 38 Such an agreement promises to be an excellent
opportunity for Colombian businesses since CARICOM has a per capita income nearly
doubling that of Colombia.39
D. THE GROUP OF THREE
I. Trade and Legal Developments
After more than three years of negotiation, Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico con-
cluded negotiations last May to create a free trade accord. 40 The Group of Three, also
known as "the G-3 Accord;' is expected to create a new common market of 140 million
people, thus becoming one of the largest free trade zones created in the Americas after
NAFTA. 4 1 Besides gradually lowering tariffs (10 per cent eliminated each year) and other
31. BBC Monitoring Service, supra note 11. Reuter Newswire, Colombia: Colombia to Request Talks
on Joining MERCOSUR, (Sep. 22, 1994).
32. Inter Press Service, South America-Trade: Talks Begin Between MERCOSUR, Andean Pact, (Jan. 3,
1995).
33. Financial Times, supra note 25.
34. Reuter Newswire, Colombia: Caribbean Nations Aim to Create Free-Trade Zone, (July 22, 1994).
35. Inter Press Service, Chile-CARICOM: Caribbean Ministers to Sign Accords with Chile, (Jan. 23,
1995).




40. Reuter Newswire, Mexico: Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela Reach Trade Accord, (May 12, 1994).
41. Reuter Newswire, supra note 4.
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trade barriers among the three nations, the Group of Three, like NAFTA, sets commercial
standards and establishes a dispute-resolution mechanism. 42 Much like MERCOSUR's
and CARICOM's recent free trade expansion agreements, the Group of Three's pact also
went into effect on January 1, 1995, after legislative approval in the three countries.43
The Group of Three also envisions an expansion of its membership. According to
Pedro Noyola, Mexico's undersecretary for trade and foreign investment, Mexico hopes to
expand the G3 pact to include all Andean Pact countries as well as Costa Rica and all of
Central America. 44
E. THE ANDEAN PACT
1. Trade and Legal Developments
The members of the Andean Pact include Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and
Bolivia.45 Although the trade agreement was negotiated in 1969, it has "only taken off in
[the] last five years, during which all countries slashed tariffs."46 Trade ministers from the
Andean Pact nations agreed last November to establish a common external tariff by
February 1, 1995, which covers approximately 90 per cent of all traded goods.47 In addi-
tion, countries like Chile have been negotiating bilateral free-trade agreements with
Andean Pact members. 48
Along with such trade expansion, the members of the Andean Pact are also consider-
ing joining forces with MERCOSUR. Indeed, on January 23, 1995, foreign ministers from
the Andean Pact signatory countries announced their intention of negotiating a trade
agreement with MERCOSUR by June 30, 1995. 49 At a November conference of Andean
Pact leaders, Bolivian Foreign Minister Antonio Aranibar confidently mentioned the pos-
sibility of "a future merger of the two integration blocs."50
F The Central American Common Market
The Central American Common Market, like the Andean Pact, was formed in the
1960s, but has only "taken off" in the last five years. 51 The members of this common mar-
ket include Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Panama, Honduras and Nicaragua. 52
42. Reuter Newswire, supra note 32. Inter Press Service, Trade: Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela set
Mid-Term Goals in G3, (Jan. 6,1995).
43. Id.
44. Reuter Textline, Euromoney Trade Finance and Banker International, South America: South
American Trade Tangles, (Jun. 30, 1994).
45. Inter Press Service, MERCOSUR-Andean Pact: Blocs Consider Extending Bilateral Accords, (Nov.
1, 1994).
46. Sunday Age (Melbourne) (SMAGE), supra note 12.
47. 11 Int'l Trade Reporter (BNA) No. 47, p. 1842 (Nov. 30, 1994).
48. Los Angeles Times, supra note 30.
49. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Andean Pact Foreign Ministers Agree to Promote Trade
Accord with MERCOSUR, (Feb. 7, 1995).
50. BBC Monitoring Service, supra note 11.
51. Sydney Morning Herald (SMHLD), supra note 2.
52. Sunday Age (Melbourne) (SMAGE), supra note 12.
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II. The Role of Existing Trade Agreements in the Formation of the FTAA
A. ANOTHER TowER OF BABEL?
In view of the fact that countless diverse trade agreements are continuously being
created and expanded throughout our hemisphere, significant doubts have understand-
ably been cast with respect to the success of a unified agreement such as the Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas. As Chile's President, Eduardo Frei, warned, the "evident mul-
tiplicity of treaties, both bilateral and multilateral, threatens to create a real Tower of
Babel for trade.53
Similar doubts have also arisen due to the great economic disparity found among
various potential FTAA member nations. 54 The present three NAFTA countries, for
instance, are the dominant and most developed nations of the hemisphere with about 80
percent of the wealth of the two continents, while Latin American countries like Ecuador
and the Caribbean nations are based on significantly smaller economies, different
exchange rate fluctuations, dissimilar tax structures and access to credit and technology.55
Such distinguishing factors "have an impact on the comparative advantage and the rela-
tive competitiveness of one nation's industry vis-a-vis other nations." 56 Such economic
disparity has been underscored by the recurring Caribbean concern that "free trade not
swamp their own industries nor hurt their access to US and Canadian markets" because
of their fragile economies. 57
While recognizing the potential negative repercussions that might result from a con-
certed effort to unite thirty-four distinct nations under a single trade agreement, leaders
at the Summit of the Americas were encouraged to center their discussions on the "sub-
stantial range of topics that unite [them], not on the circumstances that separate
[them] ."58 The practicality of such an approach was undoubtedly instrumental in allow-
ing CARICOM to successfully persuade summit planners to take into account "the het-
erogeneity and diversity of economic development levels" when formulating the pro-
posed FTAA.59 As Canada's Prime Minister, Jean Chretien, noted, "the important point is
the recognition by summit leaders that protectionism is over."60 By focusing more on
their common trading objectives, prospective FTAA members will achieve a more stream-
lined formation of a hemispheric bloc.
53. Guardian (G), supra note 1.
54. Id.
55. Id. Currents: International Trade Journal, MERCOSUR: The South American Common Market,
Juan E. Curutchet (Spring 1994), South Texas College of Law.
56. Currents: International Trade Journal, supra note 44.
57. Guardian (G), supra note 1.
58. BBC Monitoring Service, USA: Gaviria Inaugurated as OAS Secretary-General; Discusses Cuba,
Haiti, Other Issues, (Sep. 17, 1994).
59. Reuter Newswire, Jamaica: Caribbean Pushes Bananas, Trade Issues at Summit, (Dec. 8, 1994).
60. Financial Post (FINPO), USA: All-Americas Free Trade Must Face Post-Summit Reality, (Dec. 13,
1994).
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B. THE FTAA. A HOPEFUL FUTURE
Despite the overwhelming diversity in economies and the different stages at which
existing trade agreements find themselves, leaders at the Miami Summit concurred that a
strong possibility exists in the eventual convergence of the various trade pacts in order to
form one unified hemispheric trade bloc. The movement towards such unification is
already taking place as members of several trade agreements like NAFTA, MERCOSUR
and CARICOM negotiate economic unification with other countries as a means of
expanding their own membership. As one economic expert predicted, "there's going to be
a consolidation ... of the South American countries and at some point [there will be] a
negotiation between NAFTA and an expanded MERCOSUR." 61
As a way to ensure that the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas becomes a reality,
the Miami Summit leaders agreed on a timetable for trade ministers and government
officials to follow over the next two years as a means of ensuring that "momentum is
maintained."62 In addition, the actual construction of the agreement will be consistent
with GATT/WTO, the world trade pact signed by President Clinton this past December.63
Beginning this January, bureaucrats have begun meeting "to sort out how all of these
trade agreements could intermingle."64 Chilean Finance Minister Eduardo Aninat said
that "the 'key' to the integration of the Americas 'is the harmonization of the rules' of the
different bilateral and multilateral trade agreements currently in force in the region. He
added that the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Organization of
American States (OAS) 'will have the beautiful and difficult task of handling that job. ' 6 5
According to one report, "the OAS is ready to assume the responsibilities it is assigned at
[the Miami Summit], because to make the promises a reality it is not enough to define
stereotype follow-up or evaluation mechanisms. Responsible institutions must assume
the task of making initiatives a reality.66 Among the most significant tasks assigned to the
OAS was the study of existing trade arrangements "with a view to extracting common ele-
ments" and to find "ways to bring the agreements together "' 67 Such clear-cut plans for the
creation of the FTAA are unprecedented and will undoubtedly lead to the eventual cre-
ation of "one big free trading zone of consumers with rising incomes and desires for
goods and services that can improve their lives "' 68
III. The FTAA and its Relationship to Other Major Trade Areas
While fully supporting specific plans towards the creation of the FTAA, the United
States nevertheless urged the summit leaders to exercise caution in the interim as they




64. Financial Post (FINPO), supra note 2.
65. BBC Monitoring Service, USA: Chilean President Welcomes Invitation to Join NAFTA as "Historic
Step" - Summit, (Dec. 13, 1994).
66. BBC Monitoring Service, supra note 46.
67. 12 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) No. 3, p. 134 (Jan. 18, 1995).
68. Advertising Age (ADVAGE), USA: Latin America's Ad Hub, (Apr. 11, 1994).
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"it is important to develop the Americas pact before countries outside the hemisphere ...
are allowed to join.'69 Although the United States does not expect the FTAA to be exclu-
sionary, the Deputy U.S. Trade Representative made it clear that "any trade benefits nego-
tiated among the [FTAA's] members would be offered only to outside countries if those
countries made reciprocal cuts in their trade barriers."70 The real challenge for the FTAA
thus becomes, as Chile's President noted, "to integrate the [various) regional groupings ...
while also opening economies to the rest of the world."71
A. THE FTAA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU)
Recent trading overtures by Canada to the European Union have proved controver-
sial in view of the recently agreed-to hemispheric objective to form a unified trading
zone. The Canadian Prime Minister, for instance, invited the EU to sign a new bilateral
trade agreement with his country. Although such an invitation was viewed by the United
States as a way to give the EU "a back door access to both NAFTA and the Americas agree-
ment' Canadian trade officials insist the offer was simply "a suggestion to allow Canada
and the EU to re-establish closer ties now that the Cold War is over.' 72 Whatever the actu-
al intentions of Canada may have been, it is clear that the formation of the FTAA is
imposing a certain type of hemispheric protectionist stance, at least until a substantial
part of the FTAA has been firmly established.
Strategic trading activities by the European Union have likewise been subject to suspi-
cious review by prospective FTAA members. Long before NAFTA was formulated, the EU
and MERCOSUR underwent a series of serious negotiating sessions to sign a bilateral trade
agreement. 73 The strong possibility that such an agreement will be finalized long before the
FTAA, along with recent attempts by the EU to initiate trading negotiations with Chile and
Mexico, has inevitably resulted in increased scrutiny by the rest of the FTAA nations.74
Indeed, in February of 1995, the European Commission agreed on a new strategy for "closer
economic, political and commercial links with Mexico. '75 Although this proposal must first
be approved by the EU's Council of Ministers, it nevertheless embodies yet another signifi-
cant step by the EU in its efforts to cooperate with a NAFTA signatory.76
B. THE FrAA AND THE AsA PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION (APEC)
Although at first glance the emerging FTAA and the APEC appear to share no com-
mon ground, they do have several member nations in common: the United States,
Canada, Mexico and Chile. 77 Indeed, a major factor linking both trade zones is "Wash-
69. Financial Post (FINPO), supra note 12.
70. Sydney Morning Herald (SMHLD), supra note 2.
71.Guardian (G), supra note 1.
72. Financial Post (FINPO), supra note 12.
73. Id.
74. Id. Economist (EC), USA: Pan-American Free Trade, (Dec. 17, 1994). The Economist Newspaper,
Ltd., Pan-American Free Trade; Maybe, but how?, (Dec. 17, 1994).
75. The Reuter European Community Report, EU Commission Agrees Strategy for Closer Mexico
Links, (Feb. 8, 1995).
76. Id.
77. Australian Financial Review (AFR), supra note 7.
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ington's role as the hub of both, economically and in policy-making."78 Thus, the United
States will inevitably face the question posed by its prospective fellow FTAA member
nations; that is, which region the U.S. regards as its "main trade priority" Latin America
or the Asia-Pacific.
79
Since the role of APEC will undoubtedly become a controversial issue as FTAA nego-
tiations progress, the relative importance of the two free-trade areas to the economy of
the United States must be considered. 80 "Although the Asia-Pacific region is the fastest
growing area in the world, the US has a bigger share of the market in Latin America
[which is] also far more advanced in terms of the numbers of existing subregional trade
agreements than the 18 members of APEC "'8 1
Given the more advantageous position of the United States in the western hemi-
sphere, the concept of firming up the FTAA before actually negotiating with other major
trade zones seems to be the most prudential approach.
-Laura C. Reyes M.
78. South China Morning Post (SCMP), USA: Free Trade Drive Gathers Pace, (Dec. 4, 1994).
79. Id.
80. South China Morning Post (SCMP), supra note 62.
8 1. Sydney Morning Herald (SMHLD), supra note 2.
